Building on the Stoughton Estate-Part IV-Why do we keep building homes?

Most of us only consider building applications if they look like they might affect us personally. If they look likely to take away our uninterrupted views and encroach on the space, we enjoy between settlements. Many of us feel aggrieved at the ecological and environmental impacts of the unrelenting spread of new buildings springing up across the country, particularly on greenfield, agricultural land. Some of us actively campaign against specific schemes but without the slightest clue of how the system works.

In the previous article some light is shed on local plans how they come about and what they mean in practice (McFadyen J (2026), Building on the Stoughton Estate-Do we need to and can we fight it? Evington-Echo-on-Line, 18th February 2026).   In this piece the reasons for building are considered in political and economic terms

Even when population growth is modest, the number of households usually rises faster because people live longer, more people live alone, families are smaller, and separation and divorce increase household numbers. Thus, a country can need more homes even if its population isn’t growing much.

Housing shortages drive wider economic problems. When there aren’t enough homes, rents rise faster than wages young people can’t form households, workers can’t move to where jobs are and businesses struggle to recruit. Welfare costs rise (housing benefit, temporary accommodation) and Governments end up paying more money later if supply isn’t addressed.

Market failure is a factor; the private sector won’t meet all needs as private developers tend to build where profits are highest, not where need is greatest, they release homes slowly to maintain prices, avoid low-income or specialist housing unless subsidised, this leaves shortages of social housing, few affordable homes and overcrowding or poor-quality rentals.

Land Value Uplift (LVU) is the increase in land value that occurs when something external, usually a public decision, makes that land more valuable. In planning terms, it most commonly happens when agricultural land receives residential planning permission, Infrastructure (roads, rail, schools) are built nearby, and land is allocated in a Local Plan for development

A field worth £10,000 per acre for farming can become worth £1m or more per acre once allocated for housing. That increase in value is not created by the landowner but arises from public policy decisions.

In housing debates (including around Harborough and Leicester edge sites), LVU is central because It explains why greenfield allocations are financially attractive, it influences which sites developers promote, and it affects whether councils can genuinely fund infrastructure.

Critics argue the system incentivises greenfield release and that councils compete for deliverability rather than long-term sustainability.

England’s housing crisis is closely linked with the cost of land. Land is typically the largest single expense of any new housing development, and its value can increase dramatically if planning permission is granted. Similarly, the provision of new public infrastructure, such as transport links, has a major impact on local land values. These increases in land value occur independent of any productive activity or investment by landowners or developers yet still yield substantial profits to them. Land value capture policies therefore seek to recover some of these increases in land value which are usually the result of local authority or community decisions. Revenues raised may then be used to fund affordable housing and public infrastructure associated with development, such as roads, GP surgeries, and schools, through section 106 agreements.

Infrastructure and public services depend on housing supply, schools, hospitals, transport and utilities are planned on long timescales. If housing supply doesn’t keep pace existing infrastructure is overstretched, commuting distances increase and environmental impacts worsen. Planned housing lets governments coordinate growth, rather than react to it.

Another factor is political and social stability, housing shortages correlate strongly with falling living standards, intergenerational inequality and public dissatisfaction and protest. Home ownership and secure renting are closely tied to family formation, community stability, and voter confidence in government. So, governments ignore housing at their peril.

Long-term underbuilding creates a “debt” with many countries (including the UK) underbuilding for decades. That creates a structural backlog, meaning governments must build more than “current need” or accept permanently high prices and rents. This is why targets often feel high or relentless.

“The government is committed to tackling this country’s housing crisis. Decades of failure to build enough homes has constrained growth, pushed ownership out of reach for too many, driven rents to unaffordable levels, and seen more and more people fall into temporary accommodation – including 170,000 children.”  Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2025)

Into the mix we throw climate and quality goals. New homes aren’t just about numbers; older housing is often energy-inefficient and poor-quality homes worsen health outcomes. Net-zero targets require better standards. Replacing or supplementing old stock becomes unavoidable.

The underlying truth is that Governments build homes not because they want to expand endlessly, but because doing nothing makes problems compound. It leads to higher costs, lower productivity, worse inequality and political instability.

Once shortages exist, every government, left, right, or centre ends up facing the same arithmetic.

Pressure is especially intense in England because it is not just about population, it’s about constraints plus past decisions. Very high demand in a small, tightly controlled country, with a high population density, especially in the South and Midlands where Jobs, universities, hospitals and infrastructure are heavily concentrated and people need to live near economic centres.

Unlike countries with large expandable cities, England funnels demand into limited areas, has strong planning constraints. England has, Green Belt, areas of outstanding natural beauty, and National Parks. There are tight settlement boundaries and historic town patterns. These protections are politically popular, but they compress development into fewer places, pushing prices up.

Decades of underbuilding since the 1980s has seen social housing construction collapsed and private building never replaced it. Household growth quietly outpaced supply, creating a structural shortage, not a short-term blip. So, today’s governments aren’t just meeting current need, they’re trying (often unsuccessfully) to repay 40 years of housing debt.

So why national housing targets clash with local opposition, this is one of the deepest contradictions in English planning? Benefits are national, impacts are local. National benefits include lower rents and prices, labour mobility, economic growth. Local costs include loss of countryside, increased traffic, school and GP pressure, perceived loss of village identity.

So even people who accept the principle of housing often oppose it near them.

There is a tension between local democracy and national responsibility. Councils are blamed for approving development, consequently they face local elections and resident pressure, they don’t control migration, interest rates or housing demand.

Central government sets targets, Is judged on national affordability and often overrides local plans on appeal. This creates a sense that development is imposed, even when technically plan-led.

There are ‘trust’ problems, many communities believing that Infrastructure will come “later” (or never), affordable housing promises won’t be kept, developers will maximise profit, not quality and even when some of this isn’t true, the credibility gap fuels resistance.

So, could alternatives to large-scale housebuilding realistically work? The short answer is they help, but none are big enough on their own. Using empty homes is helpful locally but numbers are small compared to national need. Many are empty for practical reasons (sale, probate, renovation).

Good policy is also not a solution to shortages. For example, converting offices and brownfield land is already heavily used and often produces small, poor-quality homes. Brownfield sites are finite and expensive to remediate. So again, useful but limited.

Reducing demand instead of increasing supply ideas about which include regional job redistribution, remote working and migration controls. These can slow growth, but they don’t reverse decades of backlog, they don’t help young people forming households now and governments have limited control over lifestyle choices.

The uncomfortable reality, once a country reaches England’s situation of high demand, strong protections and long-term undersupply is that there are only three options. Build more homes, accept permanently high housing costs and radically change where and how people live.

Most governments choose the first option because the others are politically or socially harder.

Thus, there are core tensions. England wants affordable homes, protected countryside, local control, and no visible change — and those four goals cannot all be met at the same time.

Sources:

1-https://www.bing.com/videos/riverview/relatedvideo?q=brownfield+development+estimates&mid=654BF4CDAB8EDE12B45C654BF4CDAB8EDE12B45C&churl=https%3a%2f%2fwww.youtube.com%2fchannel%2fUC9jtWjaSUE1A0_D-ge2fltA&FORM=VIRE

2- https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5901/cmselect/cmcomloc/672/report.html#heading-0

3-https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/697b6bc6aacd0dc9777b4fd2/December_2025_NPPF_Consultation.pdf